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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Civil Courts' Jurisdictions Over Church
Doctrines
Seldom has a decision touched off such a furor of lay discussion in
North Carolina as did that of Reid v. Johnston.1 Briefly, the facts of
that decision are these: The North Rocky Mount Baptist Church was
a member of the North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions.
The majority of its membership, led by the pastor, voted to disaffiliate
from both those associations and to enroll the church into membership
in the General Association of Regular Baptist Churches. The legal
issue was whether the majority could control the property of the church
as against the minority who wished to remain affiliated with the North
Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The court held that the
minority should control the property. The reasoning was that only the
church could control its property and the church was those members-
even a minority-who adhere to the customs, practices and doctrines
accepted by both groups before dissension. Since the tenets of the
Southern Baptist and North Carolina Baptist Conventions had been
accepted by both groups before dissension, the minority who remained
loyal to those conventions controlled the property.
This raises the fundamental issue-when will civil courts take juris-
diction over, and adjudicate ecclesiastical doctrines?
It is well settled, that under our government, founded as it is, on
separation of church and state, civil courts will not entertain contro-
versies relating to strictly ecclesiastical doctrines or laws. 2 Generally,
civil courts will investigate ecclesiastical matters if property rights are
involved. A Texas case states a common formulation of the principle :3
"In disputes between factions of religious societies the only questions
)vhich the civil courts are authorized to determine are those affecting
property rights. In such controversies, ecclesiastical or doctrinal ques-
tions will only be inquired in so far as may be necessary to determine
the property rights of the parties."
In Watson v. Jones,4 generally accepted as the leading case on the
subject, the court classifies the types of situations which come before
the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by an ecclesiastical
1241 N. C. 201, 85 S. E. 2d 114 (1954), See Case Survey 34 N. C. L. REv. 26
(1955).
76 C. J. S., Religious Societies, Sec. 86 (1952).
'Mendolsohn v. Gordon, 156 S. W. 1149 Tex. Civ. App. (1913).
'13 Wall. (U. S. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1872).
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body in which there has been a schism as follows: (1). Where the
property is held by the religious society subject to an express trust, i.e.
where the instrument by its terms spells out to what uses the property
is to be devoted. (2). Where the property is held by a hierarchial
church-a church over which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals
with ultimate power of control over the whole membership. (3). Where
the property is held by a church which is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical organizations "and, so far as church government is con-
cerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority."5
Property Subject to an Express Trust
The first of these situations may be illustrated by assuming that
a decedent had devised land "to the Downtown Baptist Church as long
as that church follows the doctrine of total immersion," and that a
majority of that church had later rejected that doctrine. To which
group would the control of the devised property remain? As stated
by the Tennessee court in Nance v. Busby:6 "In the case of a definite
trust for the maintainance of a particular faith or form of worship the
court will even go so far as to prevent the diversion of the property by
the action of the majority of the beneficiaries, and if there be a minority
who adhere to the original principles, such minority will be held to
comprise the exclusive beneficiaries, and entitled to the control and
enjoyment of the property without interference by the unfaithful ma-
jority." In other words, courts will enforce the terms of a trust and
thereby carry out the settlor's expressed intent wherever possible. This
principle, with reference to property held by a congregational or inde-
pendent society subject to an express trust, is generally conceded.
However, where the terms of the trust are not clearly spelled out, a
question of construction remains as to the exact uses to which the prop-
erty is restricted. It is in determining this question that the civil courts
do become involved in the investigation and comparison of religious doc-
trines.
Property of a Hierarchical Church
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated the applicable
principle in this area in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas CathedraU' At issue
in that case was the beneficial use of the St. Nicholas Cathedral, the seat
of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America. In 1924 the plain-
tiffs, who represented most of the Russian Orthodox Churches in the
United States, seceded from the administrative control of the Moscow
Patriarch and formed the Independent American Church. That action
5 Id. at 718, 20 L. Ed. 666 at 674.
'91 Tenn. 303, 18 S. W. 874 (1892).
7 344 U. S. 94 (1952).
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was taken because of attempts of the Soviet Government to control
the patriarchate. In asserting the right to the property, the plaintiffs
raised no question as to the legitimacy of the Patriarch, or as to his
appointments, or as to the orthodoxy of the Mother church, but relied
on a New York statute which stated that the beneficial owner of all
Russian Orthodox Church property in the state was the Independent
American Church. 8  The New York Court of Appeals held for the
plaintiffs and found that the statute was within the province of the
legislature in that it was a legitimate supervision of religious corpora-
tions "and was a recognition, reasonably founded, that the Church in
Moscow was no longer capable of functioning as a true religious body,
but had become a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed
to implement its foreign policy."9
The Supreme Court reversed and held the statute to be invalid.
The decision was put squarely in terms of religious liberty-the court
said that such statutory transfer of control of church property "violates
the Fourteenth Amendment. It prohibits in this country the free
exercise of religion."' 0 The court relied heavily on the Watson case,
which itself upheld the right of the general Presbyterian judicatory to
property with which a proslavery congregation had seceded. The
Supreme Court in the Watson case said, "it is of the essence of these
religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be
binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance.""
One writer expressed the result of the decision in the Kedroff
case in this manner, "The Court thus raised to the dignity of a consti-
tutional right a hitherto debated principle of American Church law-
the principle that the property of a hierarchical church is to be dis-
posed of in accordance with the decision of its rulers, however sound
the reasons and however great the number of church members defying
this authority."' 2
Propert3 Not Subject to an Express Trust
If property were donated to the "Downtown Baptist Church" without
any specific trust being impressed thereon and subsequently a majority
of members of that church voted for an act or course of conduct different
from that which had existed previously, would the majority control the
church property?
'. Y. RELIGIOUS CORP. LAW §§ 105-08 (1945).
p302 N. Y. 1, 33, 96 N. E. 2d 56, 74 (1951), See note 64 HARv. L. REv. 1360
(1951).103 44 U. S. at 107.
1 13 Wall. (U. S.) 679, 729, 20 L. Ed. 666, 676 (1872).
167 HARv. L. REv. 110 (1953).
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The general rule is that the majority faction of an independent or
congregational church, however regular in its actions or procedures in
other respects, may not, as against a faithful minority, divert the property
of the church to another denomination or to support doctrines radically
and fundamentally opposed to the characteristic doctrines of the church
even though the property is subject to no express or specific trust.18
This differs from the rule with regard to expressly held trust property
in that in this area some changes are possible, while with respect to
property held by an express trust, the specific terms of the trust cannot,
by majority vote, be set aside or departed from.
Two questions arise here: Whether the change was a fundamental
or radical departure from previous doctrine? Should a civil court
decide whether the issue involved in such a fundamental change?
In most matters of church doctrine, the duly constituted tribunal will
decide such questions. Civil courts will not ordinarily attempt to inter-
fere with the decision of that tribunal, but will leave matters of doc-
trinal differences to be ironed out within the church. 4 It is generally
conceded that the "tribunal" referred to in congregational or independent
churches is the majority of the membership meeting in due course. A
recent summary of the law in this area is found in the following Alabama
decision :'5
"But to justify court interference it must be shown that the
purpose of the majority [of a Baptist church] is to make a
gratuitous transfer of the property to another denomination, or
to disavow and depart from the characteristic, distinctive doc-
trines and practices of the society. Such purpose must appear
either from an open avowal on the part of the majority, or from
its acts and conduct manifesting such purpose beyond all reason-
able doubt. It is not enough that a schism or division has de-
veloped among the members on account of differences of opinion
in the interpretation and application of the declared doctrines
and practices of the society; such matters must be settled by the
society itself in its own way."
One specific guidepost stands out in this area, and that is that the
withdrawal from a voluntary ecclesiastical connection is not considered
a change in fundamental doctrines or practices. As one authority ex-
" Bogard v. Boone, 200 Ky. 572, 255 S. W. 112 (1923) ; Grupe v. Radsill, 101
N. J. Eq. 145, 136 At. 911 (1927). Contra, Christian Church v. Crystal, 78 Cal.
App. 1, 247 Pac. 609 (1926), But c.f. Dyer v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 260,
271 Pac. 113 (1928).
", Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S. E. 184 (1907).
"Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 So. 2d 101 (1952). For cases construing
what are fundamental changes, see Annot. 8 A. L. P_ 113 (1920), and Annot. 70
A. L. R. 83 (1931).
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presses it, "it is to be observed that the rule stated ... that the majority
faction of an independent or congregational society may not divert the
property from the denomination to which the society belongs or from
the fundamental and distinctive doctrines or tenets to which it originally
subscribed, does not prevent the majority faction of such a society, over
the objection of the minority faction, from severing a voluntary ecclesi-
astical connection of the society with another body." 16
In the case of Wehmer v. Fokenga' a rather strong decision, the
Nebraska court was faced with deciding whether the majority faction
of a Lutheran church, after having voted to leave the synod to which
they had belonged and to join another synod, could control the church
property. The trial court found as fact that the two synods differed
in both doctrine and tenets.' 8 The court held that the finding of the
trial court could not be sustained because the civil courts are not so
equipped as to make findings on ecclesiastical dogma. The court pre-
ferred to leave the question of fundamental tenets and doctrines to the
decision of the rulers of the church-the majority of members in the
local church.
The North Carolina Position 9
A proper application of the rule applied to congregational churches
is found in the case of Wheeles v. Barrett.20  Property had been con-
veyed to the "City Mission of Rocky Mount" which was a non-denom-
inational religious and social organization promoting religious training,
education, Christian unity, and the spreading of the Gospel. Subse-
quently, a majority of members voted to form, from the Mission, "The
Central Baptist Church." After this was done the issue of control of the
property arose and the court held that the diversion of the property by
the majority was without authority in law. This seems clearly within
'
0 Annot. 8 A. L. R. 105, 123 (1920).
1757 Neb. 510, 78 N. W. 28 (1899).
"8 ,. . for instance, the congregations in the Iowa synod practice what is called
'close communion'-that is, these congregations do not permit members of other
Christian churches to commune with them, while the . . . General synod admit all
Christians to their communion table. The congregations of the Iowa synod believe
in the doctrine of Chiliasm, or that Christ will visibly reign on earth for a thousand
years, ... the General synod reject this doctrine. In the matters of church
discipline or government the congregations of the Iowa synod will not allow a
minister belonging to another synod to officiate, ... the General synod permit
ministers of any synod to act as their pastors. The congregations of the Iowa
synod do not permit their members to belong to secret societies .... the Generaf
synod do not control their members as to that respect." 57 Neb. 510, 512, 78
N. W. 28 (1899).
1 Due to considerations of space the scope of the North Carolina position will
be limited to the problem presented in the principal case, i.e. non-hierarchical
churches where the property is not subject to an express trust. For cases where
property is held subject to an express trust, see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 61-3 and an-
notations thereto.2 0229 N. C. 282, 49 S. E. 2d 629 (1948).
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the general rule because there was a diversion of the property of the
Mission to another and entirely different organization, whose doctrines
were directly opposite to those of the original Mission.
Similarly, the decision in Dix v. Prutt21 follows the majority
rule of allowing the church property to be controlled by a minority
if the majority diverts the property of the church for use in another
denomination or to support of doctrines fundamentally or radically differ-
ent to the characteristic doctrines of the society as it existed before the
diversion. Basically, the facts in that case were: A minister in Danville,
Va. had been expelled from the Primitive Baptist Church of that city.
He had been given employment as a minister in Dan River after the
majority of members, with knowledge of his expulsion, had so voted.
The minority introduced evidence of the customs of Primitive Baptist
churches among which was a tenet that once a member had been expelled
from a church, he could not be accepted in another Primitive Baptist
church without having first been taken back into fellowship by the ex-
pelling church. Our court held that the majority had violated a funda-
mental doctrine of the church by employing an expelled minister and
awarded the control of property to the minority.
While the general rule was correctly stated in the Dix case there
appears to be a conflict in its application. The Alabama court when
faced with an almost identical fact situation, had this to say on the
problem.2 2 "So we will not undertake to rationalize the claimed funda-
mental differences which gave rise to the dissatisfaction in the Mount
Olive congregation. It is sufficient to say that the court, if it would,
could not determine with the slightest degree of accuracy that the method
of exclusion of Copeland from membership was that radical departure
of doctrine to justify court action."
In Organ Meeting House v. Seaford23 the majority of members of
a Lutheran church declared that the local church was leaving the synod
to which the church formerly belonged and taking membership in a
different synod, previously unknown to the Lutheran church. The
plaintiffs were trustees under the original conveyance and opposed the
movement to the new synod. The court held that it would not decide a
religious controversy between the members of the church. The court
said, "with respect to the allegation made by the plaintiffs (minority),
that the defendants, or the church they represent, have strayed from the
true faith, or that errors have crept into the church government, the
answer is, that on that question, it is not for them nor this Court to
21 194 N. C. 64, 138 S. E. 412 (1927).
"
2Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617
(1949).
2- 16 N. C. 453 (1830).
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decide. It might be more than difficult to qualify any earthly tribunal
to decide it."24
In North Carolina Christian Conference v. Allen,2 6 the court held
that a voluntary association with which an independent church is
affiliated has no control over that local church. In that case it was
held that a "conference" had no right or interest in the church property
as it was not a proper party to a suit involving the control of the church
property. The dispute arose out of the refusal of the majority of mem-
bers to accept a pastor sent by the "conference." The court by way of
explanation of the differences between hierarchical and independent
churches said, "The churches of the congregational system often combine
into associations, conferences and general conventions. But unlike such
organizations under the connectional system, these bodies under the
congregational system are purely voluntary associations for the purpose
of joining their efforts of missions and similar work, but having no
supervision, control, or governmental authority of any kind whatsoever
over the individual congregations, which are absolutely independent of
each other."26  This language by Chief Justice Clark seems strong
enough to allow a voluntary severence from such association or con-
vention by a local church of the congregational form without interference
of a civil court, i.e. that such severence is not a fundamental or radical
change of doctrine.
A converse of severence from a voluntary association is found in
Windley v. McCliney.2 There, property was deeded to "Trustees of
the Free Will Baptist Church of Pantego" and the congregation subse-
quently united with other churches and changed its name to the "United
American Free Will Baptist Church." (A minority of the local church
then objected to a revision of discipline for which the delegate of the
local church had voted.) The minority, going back to the "Free Will
Baptist Church of Pantego" claimed the church property because of the
original designation in the deed to that church. The trial court found
as fact that the discipline involved did not essentially differ in doctrine
from what had gone on before. The Supreme Court affirmed a judg-
ment which excluded neither faction from the use of the church building,
but recognized the ownership and control as being in the whole member-
ship "and that their will must be determined by the majority."28 The
court then, in effect, held that the local church did not lose its independ-
ence or identity as the "Free Will Baptist Church of Pantego" by being
a member of the association.
21 Id. at 455.
" 156 N. C. 524, 72 S. E. 617 (1911).
20 Id. at 526, 72 S. E. at 618.
27 161 N. C. 318, 77 S. E. 226 (1913).
28 Id. at 321, 77 S. E. at 228.
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Thus if a majority of the members votes to associate with a con-
vention against the wishes of the minority, there being no other change
in discipline, and the court, as here, upholds that right, then logically
it would appear that a majority could sever its relationship with the
convention and the court uphold that action.
The Reid29 case is the latest North Carolina decision on the problem.
The court, in attempting to distinguish the decision in the Organ Meeting
House30 case, held that the majority did more than merely disaffiliate
from the North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The court
listed six items, in substance as follows: (1). They ceased all con-
nection with the above mentioned Baptist conventions and withdrew
financial support of agencies sponsored by those conventions, except for
a Baptist orphanage. (2). After they disaffiliated they continued as an
Independent Baptist Church. (3). They ceased to use Sunday School
literature approved by the Southern Baptist Convention and began using
literature supplied by the General Association of Regular Baptist
Churches, in which organization they had planned to enroll. (4). The
Board of Deacons had approved the exclusive control of the pulpit by
the church's minister, Mr. Johnston. (5). They discharged several
Sunday School teachers for the reason that they opposed the views
of the majority of members. (6). Finally, the minister had done all
he could to separate himself as far as possible from the programs of the
North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions.
It is submitted that all of the above items do not successfully dis-
tinguish this case from the Organ Meeting House decision, and that
all that the majority did was implement their decision to leave the
North Carolina and Southern Baptist Conventions. The cessation of
literature and financial support to those Conventions flowed naturally
and proximately from the decision to disaffiliate. The release of em-
ployees who did not believe or teach what the majority thought, was
within the prerogative of any employer. Is the court saying that it is
permissible for the group to disaffiliate but that they must continue to
support in every manner-financially, spiritually and morally, those
organizations which they had previously voted to abandon?
The above argument seems to be strengthened by this quotation from
the Organ Meeting House case. "Whether the grantor would have
any claim to it, [church property] in case the church were to become
Mohammedan or Pagan, or profess their belief in the heathen mythology,
I am not now, nor shall I ever be called upon to give an opinion. I
am also spared from giving any opinion, provided they worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own conscience. But I am free
2D 241 N. C. 201, 85 S. E. 2d 114 (1954).
30 16 N. C. 454 (1830).
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to give the opinion, that as long as their religious tenets and devotions
are confined to the sphere of Christianity, the grantor can have no
claim; .... If the grantor has no right, on what foundation does the
plaintiffs claim rest? It appears, that they [plaintiffs] are seceders from
the church, and are not the trustees or representatives of it; they were a
minority of the members before their secession. Had they remained
in the church, they must have yielded to the government of the majority.
Much less can they have any control over it, when" they are no part of
it. It is a rule applicaable to aggregate corporations or to societies, that
the will of the majority must govern. A contrary rule would be as ab-
surd, as to say, that a lesser number contained more units than a greater.
"With respect to the allegation made by the plaintiffs, that the de-
fendants, or the church they represent, have strayed from the true
faith ... on that question, it is not for them, nor this Court to decide.
It might be more than difficult to qualify any earthly tribunal to decide
it.",8 '
On principle it would seem desirable that a religious society in a
country of religious equality should be allowed to change its faith with-
out losing its property, where no express trust is present and the church
is non-hierarchical. It is submitted that the general rule in this area
should be construed in the light of the words and spirit of the Organ
Meeting House case, and that as long as the majority "worship Almighty
God according to dictates of their own conscience" or at least remain
"confined to the sphere of Christianity," they should control the prop-
erty of the church. Civil courts should adopt the view of the Nebraska
court in the Wehmer case, "whether the religious teachings, faith, and
church polity of these synods differed in essential particulars was and
is a question for the ecclesiastical tribunals, not the civil courts. '8 2 To
hold otherwise is to have a temporal court adjudicate religious doctrines
under the guise of "property rights."
MOPTON A. SMITH.
Constitutional Law-Second Class Mail
Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to
Congress the power to establish post offices. Since the dissemination of
news has always been considered a contribution to the public good,
special mailing rates were accorded to newspapers in 1792.1 In 1879
Congress divided the mails into four classes,2 with matters coming within
,Id. at 455.
"57 Neb. 510, 516, 78 N. W. 28, 30 (1899).
'Act of February 20, 1792, I STAT. 232.
2 See. 7 of the Classification Act of 1879, as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 221 (1926)
-provides:
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